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23 February 1962

*file with NRO  
Mission Planning*

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting Held in Dr. Charyk's Office on 23 Feb 62

A meeting was held with Dr. Charyk on 23 February to provide orientation on the over-all NRO program. Following are key items covered.

1. The need for a truly activated central NRO office. Charyk agreed such an organization was necessary and that the present phantom organization did not serve the purpose. Dissolution of the organization would leave no central group for tying together the entire program both in respect to CIA and DOD and internal DOD groups.

2. Satellite Program.

a. Payloads. Should be a single assignment of over-all responsibility for development of payloads in the various satellite vehicles. Integration was even needed between the Elint and the photo packages; however, it might well be that the separate development in both El int and photo payloads might be assigned to different groups.

b. Operations.

(1) Mission Planning. Real need for Intelligence Community input.

(2) Operational Control. With increased flexibility of the systems, operational control becomes much more complicated and will require much more higher automated systems. (Implication: Should be run by Air Force, but not stated.) Requires close association with intelligence aspects of mission planning.

NRO review(s) completed.

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(3) Recovery. Will become more complicated and probably should be done by Air Force.

c. Long Range Programs.

Studies going forward on West Coast under supervision of Captain Gorman on possible future satellite programs, including particularly truly covert projects. These should be available in a month or two for review. Very little work on radar camouflage for satellites.

d. Exploitation.

Need for closer integration with exploitation groups. At the present time NSA's handling of Elint material has been totally inadequate and shockingly bad by comparison with NPIC. Real need for exploiting groups to make advance preparations for handling material they will be receiving.

e. Mapping.

With one exception, payloads for mapping purposes are in reasonably good shape - E-4 superior to ARGON, which, in turn, superior to MURAL - but no decision on use of E-4 until after successful ARGON shots. Only long range program possibly needed is a higher resolution accuracy system.

3. OX CART.

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Every effort should be made to avoid dual approach to the contractors despite the existence of recon, interceptor [redacted] programs. Recon clearly has highest priority. [redacted]

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[redacted] Charyk very clear that Agency should continue to plan for operation of recon. Probability of permission for such overflights very much greater than if military operated. Air Force would assign personnel to man any components needed, but these should be civilianized. Always possible at later date to convert from civilian to military but never possible to do the reverse.

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4. March 12 Report to President's Intelligence Board.



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b. OX CART. Monday trip may provide answer re engine. As stated, CIA will look at other aspects after visit to West Coast next weekend. Charyk invited to come along but unable to go with us.



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